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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DARRELL EUGENE HEATH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12610 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was charged with grand larceny on 
April 12, 1971, as a result of the theft of one 1965 Comet 
automobile. He was subsequently bound over to the 
Fourth Judicial District Court to stand trial. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty of grand larceny by a 
jury on May 27, 1971, and sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of from one to ten years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the decision of the district 
court should be affirmed. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of April 11, 1971, and the morning 
of April 12, 1971, a 1965 Comet automobile, owned by 
Lillian Hales and Larry Hales, was parked in front of 
their residence at 57 North 6th East in Spanish Fork, 
Utah (Tr. 19, 28). Between 5: 00 a.m. and 5: 30 a.m. on 
April 12, 1971, Lillian Hales and her husband, Duane 
Hales, heard the motor, to what they said was their 1965 
Comet, start (Tr. 12, 22). Lillian and Duane Hales looked 
out their window and saw what they believed to be their 
1965 Comet driving away from their home (Tr. 12, 22). 
Larry Hales at about 5: 30 a.m. was awakened by his 
father and he promptly called the Spanish Fork Police 
and the Utah Highway Patrol and reported his car as 
missing (Tr. 26, 27). 
At about 5: 40 a.m., Officer Bradford, of the Utah 1 
Highway Patrol attempted to pull over a 1965 Comet 
driven by the defendant but a high speed chase resulted 
(Tr. 32, 33, 34, 35). The defendant was subsequently 
apprehended and taken to jail by a Provo City Police 
Officer (Tr. 35). Officer Bradford never informed the de-
fendant of his legal rights as he did not personally place 
the defendant under arrest (Tr. 41). The defendant was 
taken to jail by the Provo City Police (Tr. 35). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN 
RE FUS ING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S 
g 
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FIRST MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CON-
CLUSION OF THE STATE'S CASE OR IN 
RE FUS ING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S 
SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE 
CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL. 
A. THE STATE DID NOT FAIL TO PROVE, 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT DEFEN-
DANT TOOK THE 1965 COMET. 
Defendant's analysis supporting his contention that 
the State failed, as a matter of law, to prove that defen-
dant took the 1965 Comet is based on three propositions. 
First, that mere possession of recently stolen goods is 
insufficient evidence upon which to base a conviction of 
larceny. Defendant cites People v. Swazey, 6 Utah 93, 
21 P. 2d 400 (1889), as supporting this contention. Sec-
ond, that the State failed to show an unsatisfactory ex-
planation for defendant's possession of recently stolen 
goods. Third, that the State must present rebuttal evi-
dence to defendant'.s explanation of his possession of the 
stolen goods. 
Defendant correctly states that mere possession of 
stolen goods is insufficient evidence upon which to base 
a conviction of larceny, People v. Swazey, supra. The 
Court in Swazey did state, however: 
"If the property had been found in the de-
fendant's possession immediately after loss, such 
possession might have been a circumstance to be 
taken into consideration by a jury, with other 
circumstances, in arriving at a conclusion as to 
4 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant." Id. at 
402. 
In the Swazey case, the " ... element of recent possession , 
with or without accompanying circumstances, did not 
I 
exist, and no guilty knowledge could be inf erred from the ' 
possession." Id. at 402. In the case at bar, the defendant 
did possess stolen goods immediately after loss. Accord-
ing to Swazey, that circumstance along with other cir· 1 
cumstances are to be considered by the jury and a de-
termination of guilt or innocence is to be made. In the 
instant case the jury considered the circumstance of pos· 
session of the recently stolen car along with other cir-
cumstances such as the fact that defendant tried to avoid 
apprehension by Officer Bradford in a high speed chase 
through Provo City, when Officer Bradford attempted 
to stop the defendant (Tr. 33, 34). In considering all of 
these circumstances the jury concluded that the defen-
dant was guilty of larceny. There was not simply the 
circumstance of the defendant possessing recently stolen 
goods but much more. For instance, the defendant had 
possession of the car almost immediately after Lillian 
and Duane Hales heard its engine start and saw the car 
being driven away from the front of their home (Tr. 12, 
22). Also, there is the fact that the defendant desperately 
tried to avoid apprehension by Officer Bradford (Tr. 33, 
34). 
Appellant further contends that the State failed to 
show an unsatisfactory explanation on the part of defen-
dant as to the reasons for his possession of the 1965 
at 
n , 
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Comet, Utah Code Annotated § 76-38-1 (1953) states: 
"Possession of property recently stolen, when 
the person in possession fails to make a satisfac-
tory explanation, shall be deemed prima facie evi-
dence of guilt." 
Appellant cites State v. Potello, 40 Utah 56, 119 P. 1023 
(1911) as supporting his proposition that the State is 
required to prove the facts of the larceny, recent posses-
sion in the defendant, and that he failed to satisfactorily 
explain his possession. It is only fair to go beyond defen-
dant's discussion of the Potello case and fully analyze its 
meaning and significance. The Court does state that a 
prima facie case cannot arise unless the state proves the 
three elements stated above. But, the Court goes on to 
say the following: 
"We are not holding that a presumption or 
an inference may not arise against the accused on 
the mere proof of the larceny and his possession 
of the recently stolen property. We are holding 
that under the express wording of the statute the 
mere proof of such facts alone is not sufficient to 
make a prima facie case of guilt, and that to make 
such a case the state, in the absence of other evi-
dence, must also prove that the accused failed to 
satisfactorily account for or explain his possession." 
Id. at 1027. (Emphasis added.) 
Appellant argues that the State must prove the three 
elements in order to get to the jury but this is correct 
only in the absence of other evidence according to Potello. 
In the case at bar there is other convincing evidence of 
defendant's guilt which the jury correctly considered in 
6 
arriving at its verdict. Further, appellant's attempt to 
avoid apprehension can indirectly serve as an explana-
tion, or lack of it, of his possession of the stolen automo-
bile. 
Defendant in the case at bar voluntarily explained 
his possession of the 19G5 Comet as part of the presenta-
tion of his case. The defendant's feeling that his expla-
nation cannot be used by the state in proving larceny is 
not as expressly condemned by the Potello case as it 
seems. The Court in Potello further explained as follows: 
"We now look to the defendant's evidence, of 
course, he cannot complain of insufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain the verdict, though the State 
failed to make a case, if he himself proved one for 
it. Does, therefore, the evidence on the part of 
the State, together with that of the defendant, 
prove the larceny and that the defendant com-
mitted it." Id. at 1029. 
In the instant case all of the evidence taken in sum 
and as viewed by the jury proves the larceny beyond a 
reasonable doubt and that the defendant committed it. 
The judge correctly allowed the case, considering all the 
evidence, to go to the jury for a determination. In State 
v. Peterson, 110 Utah 43, 174 P. 2d 843 (1946), the Court 
in a larceny case stated a general proposition: 
"A prima facie case is one based upon evi-
dence sufficient to raise a question for determina-
tion by the jury. As is often put, if the evidence 
favorable to the State, with all reasonable infer-
ences and intendments that can be drawn there-
from, could sustain a verdict of guilty the cause 
D 
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should be submitted to the jury." Id. at 845. 
The trial judge in this case determined from the evidence 
that the case was sufficient to submit to the jury and 
sustain a verdict of guilty. The sufficiency of this evi-
dence is clear from the record and has been stated herein. 
The dicta in State v. Potello, supra, that if the State 
fails to make a case, the defendant has no complaint if 
he proves part of the State's case for it has received fur-
ther support by the Utah Court. In State v. Stockton, 
6 Utah 2d 212, 310 P. 2d 398 (1957), the Court 
confronted this problem in a case arising out of a convic-
tion for attempt to commit burglary. The defense in 
Stockton presented its evidence after it moved for a di-
rected verdict after the State rested. The Court advanced 
the following principle: 
"We are of the opinion that defendant, having 
elected to put on his defense, made all testimony 
offered available for the jury's consideration." Id. 
at 400. 
The Court in Stockton cites two authorities for this prin-
ciple. The first is State v. Denison, 352 Mo. 572, 178 S. 
W. 2d 4.49 (1944). In this case the Missouri court basic-
ally stated that if the defense chooses to present evidence 
rather than stand, the trial court is bound to take the 
defendant's evidence into consideration insofar as it 
helped the state's case. See State v. Denison, supra, at 
452. Secondly, the Court in Stockton relied on the dicta 
in Patella, and the opinion specifically cites this case as 
follows: 
8 
"This court in a dicta statement in State v. 
Potello, 40 l!tah 56, at page 70, 119 P. 1023, at 
Page 1029, said: 
'. . . of course, he cannot complain of the 
insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the 
verdict, though the State failed to make a 
case, if he himself proves one for it.' " Id. at 
1029. 
The Court in Stockton has essentially followed the 
dicta in Potello and held that once the defendant elects 
to put on his case, all of the testimony offered is available 
for the jury's consideration. 
Defendant also contends that the State had the bur-
den of presenting rebuttal evidence to defendant's expla-
nation of his possession of the 1965 Comet, and if the 
State could not do so the case must be withheld from the 
jury. Respondent does not believe the law of Utah re-
quires rebuttal evidence to defendant's explanation. In 
confronting the problem of whether a situation similar 
to the one at bar could be given to the jury the court in 
State v. Hitesrrwn, 58 Utah 262, 198 P. 769 (1921) stated: 
" ... when, as here, a defendant has it entirely 
within his own power to make certain statements 
or explanations concerning his possession of re-
cently stolen property, and the state is powerless 
to meet the statements categorically, no one who 
would be willing to disregard the truth could 
be convicted of the theft where there were 
no eyewitnesses to the taking .... The jury, in 
considering all the facts and circumstances in evi-
dency may refuse to give credence to defendant's 
statements or explanations, or to those of his wit-
nesses, if such statements or explanations, in view 
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of all the facts and circumstances, seem unreason-
able or not well founded in fact. Where, as here, 
property recently stolen is found in the possession 
of the accused, it is for the jury to say whether 
his explanations and statements respecting that 
possession are satisfactory or otherwise." Id. at 
770. 
This is what occurred in the instant case. The state 
presented its evidence and the defendant explained his 
possession of the recently stolen goods. The State was 
powerless to categorically meet and contradict the de-
fendant's explanation, so, as the Hitesman case points 
out, it was for the jury to accept or reject the defendant's 
explanation in view of the facts and circumstances pre-
sented by the state. This the jury rightfully did and a 
verdict of guilty was rendered. State v. Shonka, 3 Utah 
2d 124, 279 A. 2d 711 (1955), also supports the view that 
a jury can reject an uncontradicted explanation made by 
a witness. Shonka concerned an appeal from a larceny 
conviction and the court stated therein: 
"Self interest or improbability can always be 
used to discredit or discount the value of the tes-
timony of a witness and substantive direct evi-
dence, though uncontradicted may be disbelieved 
by a jury when the witness is a party or other-
wise interested." Id. at 714. (Emphasis supplied.) 
In case at bar the Court correctly submitted the 
question to the jury and the jury could and did refuse 
to accept defendant's explanation, even though categoric-
ally uncontradicted. Moreover, all of the facts and cir-
cumstances present in this case, including defendant's ex-
10 
planation, \Vere sufficient for the jury to return a verdict 
of guilty. Also, it is contended that the defendant's futile 
attempt to avoid apprehension is at least indirect rebuttal 
to the defendant's explanation. 
B. THE STATE DID PROVE THAT DE-
FENDANT TOOK THE AUTOMOBILE 
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE 
OWNER. 
Defendant argues that the state failed to show that 
both owners of the 1965 Comet, Lillian Hales and Larry 
Hales, did not consent to the taking of the automobile. 
Specifically, defendant contends that lack of consent was 
not shown for Larry Hales and also that the record is 
devoid of any evidence upon which a jury could find that 
there was lack of consent on the part of Larry Hales. A 
review of the record shows that appellant's contention 
is not supported in fact. Moreover, there are statements 
in the transcript made by Larry Hales that provide more 
than sufficient evidence for a jury to make a rational 
finding. For instance, the following testimony occurred 
in the trial during direct examination of Larry Hales: 
THE WITNESS: Okay. I looked out the window 
and my car was missing. So I called the Highway 
Patrol and I called the Spanish Fork Police. 
Q. (By Mr. Gammon) And what did you say? 
A. I told them that my car was missing (Tr. 
27). 
Is this the testimony of someone who may have con-
sented to the taking of his automobile? Would someone 
11 
call the police and report that his car was missing if he 
had consented to its use? This testimony provides suffi-
cient evidence upon which the jury could find lack of 
consent on the part of Larry Hales. It is difficult to 
imagine the jury arriving at a different conclusion. 
With the State showing the lack of consent on the 
part of Lillian Hales (Tr. 14, 15) and Larry Hales (Tr. 
27) they sufficiently proved this necessary element of 
larceny. 
In State v. Reese, 44 Utah 256, 140 P. 126 (1914), 
the ccurt was confronted with a similar issue in a larceny 
action. The defendant in the Reese case argued that 
necessary want of consent from the railroad company, 
from which he was convicted of stealing certain cargo, 
was not sufficiently shown. The court analyzed the prob-
lem in this manner: 
"Moreover, where property is taken secretly 
and without the owner's knowledge, the proof of 
nonconsent may be inferred from other facts, since 
it cannot be assumed under such circumstances 
that the owner consented." Id. at 128. 
Although the owner in the Reese case was a corporation, 
the same reasoning applies to the case at bar. As in the 
Reese case the nonconsent can easily be inferred from 
' other facts -and it cannot be assumed that the owner con-
sented. This is clearly shown, as stated earlier, by the 
tansctipt of proceedings at the trial court. 
C. THE STATE PROVED AND THE JURY 
CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
12 
DEFENDANT TOOK THE AUTOMO-
BILE WITH INTENT TO STEAL. ! 
I 
Defendant argues a number of points on this basis 1 
for reversal. First, that defendant's intent to steal was 
shown only circumstantially. Second, that this determin. 
ation is one for the court and not the jury. Third, that 
defendant's actions in trying to avoid apprehension was 
equally consistent with innocence as guilt due to the al-
leged existence of "flashback" arising from defendant's 
drug problem. 
Defendant cites State v. Dubois, 64 Utah 433, 231 
P. 625 (1924) as supporting his position. In Dubois the 
State proved intent to steal by circumstantial evidence, 
which defendant contends is not proper. The circum· 
stances in the Dubois case, which arose from the theft 
of livestock, were that the animal was taken by a route 
which avoided observation, transporting the calf in an 
automobile, and apparent effort to avoid meeting one of 
the animal's owners. The court held that these circum-
stances, among others, justified the jury in finding felon-
ious intent. The circumstances in the Dubois case are not 
any more convincing than the circumstances in the case 
at bar where defendant desperately tried to avoid appre-
hension by the police officer. Respondent feels that they 
are not more convincing. 
Defendant's contention that the determination of 
taking with felonious intent is for the court and not the 
jury is equally weak. Again, the case of State v. Dubois, 
supra, provides a convincing answer. After the quotation 
13 
from Dubois on page 27 of defendant's brief the court 
continued: 
"As a general rule, the question of whether 
or not the taking is felonious, is a question of fact 
to be decided by the jury . . . If the evidence is 
such that all reasonable minds should arrive at 
the same conclusion that the tal<lng was without 
felonious intent, then the question becomes one of 
law, and the verdict of guilty should be set aside. 
But if, after a consideration of all the evidence, 
reasonable minds may differ and arrive at opposite 
conclusions, the findings of the jury must control." 
Id. at 626, 627. 
In reviewing all the evidence in the case at bar it is possi-
ble that reasonable minds could arrive at different con-
clusions and therefore, according to Dubois, the findings 
of the jury must control and that finding is one of intent 
to steal. 
Defendant argues further that his explanation of 
his atte!:1pt to avoid apprehension by the police is equally 
consistent with innocence as with guilt. He bases this 
on the alleged existence of drug "flashback" due to his 
drug use problem and that when he was pulled over by 
the officer he suffered a "flashback" which caused his 
reaction, i.e., the high speed chase. Respondent agrees 
with appellant that in Dr. Washburn's letter to Judge 
Sorenson of April 14, 1971 (R. 8), it was stated that the 
defendant has a serious drug problem. But, this letter 
does not make defendant's explanation of his actions as 
perfectly plausible as defendant suggests. There was no 
mention in Dr. Washburn's letter of the existence of a 
14 
drug "flashback" problem with the defendant. Seemingly U1 
if this phenomenon existed with defendant and it was in 
fact a serious problem it would have been mentioned by 
Dr. Washburn. The only mention of the existence of 
"flashback" was by the defendant. This explanation the 
jury determined not to give credence, but accepted the J 
state's evidence in its stead. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANT WAS REPRESENTED 
BY EFFECTIVE COUNSEL WHICH MET 
THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
GUARANTEE OF EFFECTIVE ASSIST-
ANCE OF COUNSEL. 
There is certainly no question that the criminal de-
fendant has the constitutional right to the assistance of 
counsel and that the counsel provide reasonably effective 
assistance as opposed to errorless assistance. See Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 
799 (1963); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F. 2d 592 (5th Cir. 
1960), modified 289 F. 2d 928. 
The defendant contends that the totality of events 
and the representation as a whole indicates the defendant 
was inadequately and ineffectively represented. Respon-
dent feels that a review of the entire record and specific-
ally the transcript reveals effective action and a vigorous 
defense on the part of the defendant's attorney. This 
claim by defendant should be carefully looked at before 
a determination of the adequacy of counsel is made. The 
tgly 
i in 
by 
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Utah Supreme Court has stated that: 
" ... this claim, now the last refuge of the 
guilty, that 'my lawyer was incompetent' should 
be carefully looked at." Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 
Utah 2d 19, 465 P. 2d 343 at 344 (1970). 
A review· of the record in the case at bar does not show 
lack of r2al concern by the defendant's attorney but 
rather a genuine and active defense. 
In State v. Farnsworth, 13 Utah 2d 103, 368 P. 2d 
914 (1962), the court would not lend credence to the 
defendant's argument that he was denied a fair trial be-
cause of the incompetency of counsel. This was because 
everything done by the attorney could rationally find 
explan:ition in a legitimate exercise of strategy. See 269 
P. 2d 914 at 915. In the Farnsworth case the defendant's 
lawyer waived the preliminary hearing, waived a jury, 
made no opening statement, failed to make objections to 
introduction of evidence, and only cross-examined one of 
the State's witnesses. The court stated that upon review-
ing the record it could not be shown that the defendant 
w2s not fairly and competently represented. In the case 
at bar, where the defendant's counsel more than ade-
quately performed the procedures not performed in the 
Farnsworth case, there is not a single action or inaction 
by counsel which could not be demonstrated as being an 
exercise of strategy. This is clearly demonstrated by the 
record. 
A review of the transcript shows a vigorous defense 
on the part of the defendant's counsel. To cite just a few 
16 
examples from the transcript it can be seen that the de- \ 
fendant's attorney objected to and defended his objection . 
to the admission of evidence (Tr. 42, 43), that counsel 
vigorously objected to the State's motion to amend the 
information (Tr. 46, 47, 48), that both witnesses for the 
defendant stated that they had discussed that case with 
the defendant's attorney prior to their testimony in court 
(Tr. 61, 66). These examples are just a few of many ex-
amples showing that the defendant had strong represen-
tation. 
The Utah Supreme Court has set up certain stan-
dards to determine whether counsel for a defendant in 
a criminal action has adequately represented his client. 
In Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P. 2d 241 (1969), 
a habeas corpus action, the court stated that the consti-
tutional right to counsel is ". . . not satisfied by a sham 
or pretense of an appearance in the record by an attorney 
who manifests no real concern about the interests of the 
accused." Id. at 243. 
The defendant alleges that his attorney made only 
short visits with him before the trial and was afforded 
only a short discussion with his attorney prior to the 
preliminary hearing. This allegation is not raised by the 
record on appeal and is therefore not properly before this 
Court. Suffice it to say, however, that a short conference 
does not mean the lawyer is not preparing or making a 
good defense. This court in Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 
2d 294, 452 P. 2d 323 (1969), in considering a similar 
issue, stated: 
17 
" ... no deficiency in that regard follows solely 
from the fact that the conferences were relatively 
brief. A conference is not inherently wrong simply 
because it does not take a long time." Id. at 324 
and 325. 
The defendant, on appeal, specifically cites as an 
example of his counsel's alleged unconstitutionally inade-
quate representation the alleged failure of counsel to in-
vestigate and assert a particular defense. This defense 
is the alleged existence of a drug "flashback" with the 
defendant. Defendant's brief asserts that the attorney 
failed to investigate and assert this defense at trial. A 
review of the record shows that this alleged "flashback" 
phenomenon was presented by the defense for the jury's 
consideration. In direct examination of the defendant 
by defendant's counsel this "flashback" phenomenon was 
presented. The following dialogue took place. 
"Q. Now, would you tell us what happened when 
the officer - did you ever see a signal from the 
officer? 
A. Well, no, not really. I just kind of blacked 
out. 
Q. Was there any reason for this? 
A. Well, they call it a flashback .... 
Q. What is this 'flashback' that you speak of? 
A. It's a flash drugs. You don't know what is 
happening. You just kind of flashout. . . ." (Tr, 
70). 
It can be seen from this dialogue that the defendant's 
18 
counsel helped, through his questioning, to have the 
"flashback" phenomenon presented to the jury. The fact 
that the jury chose not to accept this explanation does 
not mean that his counsel did an inadequate job. 
The defendant's drug problem was mentioned in the ' 
record but once aside from the transcript. This is in a 1 
letter from Dr. Washburn, at the Community Mental 
Health Center, to Judge Sorensen (R. 8). In this letter 
Dr. Washburn discussed the defendant's drug problem. 
In his discussion Dr. Washburn never mentioned the de· 
fendant's alleged drug "flashback" problem. It seems that 
if the defendant had such a problem it would have been · 
mentioned by Dr. Washburn. l 
It can clearly be seen by reviewing the record that I' 
the defendant was enthusiastically represented by CQUfi• I 
I 
sel and that the defense presented the defendant's alleged I 
"flashback" explanation to the jury. I 
As was stated in the Farnsworth case: I "The privilege of an accused to the assistance 
of counsel is a fundamental right which means a 
right to a reputable member of the bar who is will-
ing and in a position to honestly and conscien-
tiously represent his interests." 368 P. 2d 914 at 
915. 
I 
This is what the defendant had in the instant case; 
a reputable member of the bar who honestly and con-
scientiously represented his interests. The record com-
pels this conclusion and thus the conclusion that the 
defendant had constitutionally adequate counsel. 
l 
I 
I 
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Respondent does not address itself any further to 
the allegations of incompetency of counsel raised by the 
affidavit of Appellant. It is well settled that on appeal 
the Supreme Court may only consider items properly 
before it as part of the record on appeal. People v. Calla-
ghan, 4 Utah 49, 63, 6 P. 49 (1885); Atkinson v. Pelle-
grino, 110 Utah 363, 173 P. 2d 543 (1946); Adamson v. 
Brochbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P. 2d 264 (1947). The mere 
physical presence of a document in the file is irrelevant 
if it is not properly part of the record on appeal. Adam-
son v. Brockbank, supra. 
The present record on appeal was certified and trans-
mitted to the Supreme Court by the County Clerk on 
August 4, 1971. Appellant's affidavit is not part of that 
record. The affidavit was prepared on September 22, 1971 
and filed with the Supreme Court on September 23, 1971 
with no indication that any proper procedures were com-
plied with to make it part of the record. Clearly any 
allegations made in the affidavit may not be considered 
on this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent contends that the sum of evidence 
presented to the jury in this action was sufficient for a 
verdict of guilty to be rendered. The State proved that 
the automobile was taken without consent of the owners 
and the defendant failed to satisfactorily explain his pos-
scss£on of the recently stolen automobile. 
Also it is contended that the record as a whole shows 
' 
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that the defendant's lawyer performed his duties in pre. 
paring and presenting a defense in an exemplary manner. 
The defense was such as to completely dispel any con. 
tention that the defendant was denied his constitutional 
right to adequate counsel. 
For the above-stated reasons, the Respondent re· 
spectfully requests that the conviction of the defendant 
for grand larceny be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
